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NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY
HUNGARIAN POLITICS
by Leslie A. Muray
Dr. Leslie Muray (Episcopalian) is teaching religious studies at Lansing Community
College, Central Michigan University, and Western Michigan University. He received the
Rel. M. degree from Claremont School of Theology and the Ph.D. degree from
Claremont Graduate School. Dr. Muray, a native of Hungary, is the author of numerous
articles on Hungary, some of which appeared in this publication.
Even the most anti-nationalist liberal in contemporary Hungary would not find my
response to the invitation to write this paper by saying, "Isten áld meg a Magyart!" ("God
Bless the Hungarian", the title and refrain of the Hungarian National Anthem)
particularly unusual or objectionable, but merely stating a historical fact, illustrating
vividly the pervasive depths of nationalist feeling. I also need to point out that such a
deep feeling of national pride is hardly the original sin of Hungarians, substitute the name
of any country and people in the region and one will find each one proudly asserting that
they have historically represented the entire region, their struggles and sufferings endured
for the sake of civilization itself.
Before outlining what I attempt to accomplish in this paper, a few remarks that will,
hopefully, prove illuminating are in order. Hungarian life and culture, politics and
religion, the Hungarian "soul" itself, is full of paradoxes and contradictions,
countervailing tendencies and forces. For example, there is an old Hungarian saying to
the effect that whenever you get two Hungarians together, you will find at least three
political parties! Anyone who has grown up in an Hungarian family like I did knows the
element of truth in that statement. And precisely because Hungarian politics is so
fractious and contentious (even in the supposedly monolithic Stalinist period, there was
an epic power struggle between the "natives" and the "Muscovites" that shaped in
profound ways the events preceding, including and following the uprising of 1956), there
is a tendency to emphasize national unity, "pulling together," in order to overcome
fragmentation; often by the same people who celebrate the diversity of worldviews and
political ideas.
In similar fashion, given Hungary's numerous struggles for independence, against
oppression, and for the extension of the sphere of freedom to larger segments of the
population, there is a nearly anarchic, romantic love of freedom in the Hungarian soul. A
marvelous illustration of this is the famous incident during the Revolution of 1956 when
a much inconvenienced crowd cheered the fact that a trolley car was arriving late! At the
same time, given the fact that so much of life for so long has been insecure and
unpredictable, there exists a profound desire for security and order; often on the part of
the same people who relish the anarchic love of freedom. Needless to say, the most
persistent issues of Hungarian life are how to reconcile political pluralism and diversity
with national unity, anarchic, romantic love of freedom with security and order. As we

shall see, these are not only socio-political-economic-cultural issues, but profoundly
religious as well.
Now to turn to the contents of this paper. The first section examines the orientation of the
political parties that participated in the roundtable negotiations and that have been major
players on the political scene since then toward issues pertinent to religion, nationalism,
and the resurgence of nationalist populism. The second section analyzes the most pivotal
series of events in the transition from communism to postcommunism, the split in the
ranks of the Opposition Roundtable on the issue of the popular referendum concerning
the presidency and the outcome of the referendum itself. This series of events has
haunted the major party of the ruling coalition, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, since
then, leading to the questioning of the government's very legitimacy. I also analyze the
impact of the referendum on the elections of 1990.
The third section examines political developments since 1990 that are relevant to the
complex relationship between religion, nationalism, and populism, highlighting the much
publicized drift to the right, most evident in the resurgence of anti-Semitism and of
nationalist passion concerning territories containing large populations of ethnic
Hungarians ceded to neighboring countries in the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, the stop to
that drift, and the ensuing isolation of the extreme right. I also make the claim that the
roots of contemporary Hungarian political trends can be most appropriately traced to the
quite heterogeneous group of populist writers that came to prominence in the 1930's. Of
diverse religious backgrounds and orientations, with some of them quite anti-clerical and
hostile to religious institutions, all of the populist writers fused elements of the Christian
myths with their populist ethos. The contemporary importance of these writers needs to
be seen in the context of a country, in fact, for the most part, the diverse cultures of an
entire region, where historically religion and culture are inseparable, as is quite evident
today in spite of the efforts to suppress religion during the Communist Period. I conclude
this section with a discussion of the subsequent drift to the left culminating in the election
of the Socialists in 1994. The fourth section deals with some of the basic dynamics of
contemporary religious life and its complex relationship to politics.
The final section concludes with a summary and some tentative evaluative remarks.
I.
One of the major events of modern Hungarian history occurred on September 18, 1989
when the agreement resulting from the Round Table negotiations was signed and
announced. Free, multi-party elections had been agreed upon; a presidential election, with
the President of the Republic chosen by popular vote, was scheduled for November.
Parliamentary elections would be held later.
Among the nascent political parties participating in the negotiations that would play
important roles during the election campaign were the Hungarian Democratic Forum
(MDF), the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), the Independent Smallholders' party,
the Social Democratic Party, the Hungarian People's Party, and the Christian Democratic

People's Party. The Alliance (Federation) of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) was not
recognized as part of the Roundtable Opposition by the Communist party (Hungarian
Socialist Workers' Party or MSZMP) although it did participate in the Roundtable
Opposition's own strategizing sessions and became a signatory to the negotiations.
Before I turn to the events surrounding the referendum on the presidency, a look at the
histories, backgrounds, and orientations of the major political parties may prove to be
helpful. The Hungarian Democratic Forum was the first of the major parties to be
established, founded in November, 1987, at Lakitelek, a meeting that is now part of the
"mythos" of the transition, particularly since it was a follow up to a meeting on the part of
the various factions of what was then the opposition at Monor in the previous year under
the leadership of Ferenc Donáth, the key figure in the dissident movement in the '70s and
'80s, who had been one of the leaders of the "native" Communists during World War II,
played a leading role in the cabinet of Imre Nagy during the Revolution of 1956, and
served a three year prison term in the same case that saw Nagy, Pál Maleter, and Miklós
Gimes executed.
Founded primarily by populist writers, among them Sándor Csoori and István Csurka, the
MDF emphasized national issues and historic traditions, pursued a policy of moderation,
and recognized its potential strength in the villages and towns, the traditional strongholds
of Hungarian populism (during the elections, MDF would be the only party to have a
grass roots organization in every village, town, and city in Hungary). It also had a very
good relationship with the populist wing of the MSZMP, particularly with Imre Pozsgay,
who was the first among leading Communists to call the Revolution of 1956 a "popular
uprising" and who played a vital role in winning approval for the ceremonial reburial of
Imre Nagy and his martyred friends and in the entire negotiating process.
The Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP) is the only political party on the current
scene that also existed prior to the Communist takeover. In fact, it was founded in 1930
as a party of independent farmers, later expanding its constituency to include the middle
class. In the elections of 1945, it had been the overwhelming winner, taking 57% of the
vote. As the elections were approaching in 1990, the party split into two (now three)
reflecting its rural and middle class constituencies. The orientations of both wings
stressed some populist themes, i.e. emphasis on historic traditions, with a Christiannational hue, and a liberal economic program.
The third significant populist group, although small in membership, was the Hungarian
People's Party, which saw itself as the successor to the National Peasants' Party, a radical,
democratic, populist party established during World War II primarily by populist writers
and that played, in spite of its small size and percentage of the vote, a significant role in
post-war coalition politics. After the first round of the elections in March, 1990, it would
become insignificant.
The Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) includes tendencies that look to
Western European models of Christian Democracy, particularly the German, as well as
romantic views of national community as its central idea. Although committed to

parliamentary democracy and a multiparty system, they do tend to see individual rights as
secondary to the prerogatives of traditionally collective units of society. Socially
conservative and nationalist, they are concerned with the high number of abortions, with
what they see as the collapse of Hungarian moral character, and emphasize historical
continuity (i.e. the historic state concept of the Crown of St. Stephen). For them,
Transylvania, a part of Romania since the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, is of vital
importance, not "just" a matter of the human rights of ethnic Hungarians. I should add
that the conservatives of the KDNP have much in common with the right wing of the
MDF and FKGP. Its more extreme elements are quite anti-Semitic and anti-Gypsy.
The two liberal parties were (and are) the Alliance of Free Democrats and Alliance of
Young Democrats. The former, an outgrowth of the dissident Network of Free Initiatives,
was comprised of urban intellectuals, most of them former Marxists, who had been
consistently at the forefront of the activities of the democratic opposition in the 1980's.
Like the MDF and FKGP, they included a broad range of wings and tendencies, ranging
from social democratic to consistently liberal in politics and economics. What all the
various factions did (and do) have in common is an uncompromising emphasis on human
rights and civil liberties, part of the heritage of being dissidents for so long, and in
various ways combining liberal economics with a social democratic emphasis on social
justice. It also needs to be pointed that part of the meaning of the word "liberal" is free
thinker, especially in the Hungarian context, namely, that there is nothing, not even
symbols of nationalism, that is beyond question.
The Alliance of Young Democrats, (FIDESZ), which grew out of the youth movement
that broke away from the official Communist youth movement (MISZOT) in March,
1988 is liberal politically and economically, established early and strong support for the
rights of marginalized minority groups (gypsies, gays and lesbians), and yet were also to
establish populist roots; they saw their liberalism in continuity with Hungary's historic
progressive movements. In many ways, they transcended the historic "populist-urbanist"
split that has dominated Hungarian politics since the 1840s. They were brash, abrasive,
young, and bold in their opposition to the Communists. Many Hungarians felt these
characteristics were a breath of fresh air. FIDESZ did have an age limitation of 35 on its
party membership, which was not lifted until the spring, 1993, and which certainly did
not preclude people from voting its candidates. It is unclear whether this age limitation
had any impact on the size of the vote it received.
The Social Democratic Party was revived. It received considerable financial and moral
backing from the Social Democratic parties of Western European which expected
Hungary to be a natural place for a Social Democratic victory. However, the Social
Democrats were severely handicapped by factional infighting largely between an old
guard of communists in their seventies and eighties against whom the younger members
did not have a chance of winning. The most important reason, however, was the memory
of the forced fusion of the Social Democratic and Communist parties in 1948. Those
Social Democrats who did become Communists were severely compromised; the names
of some of them were synonymous with the reprisals that followed the suppression of the
uprising of 1956. Moreover, although the party attracted a following among the urban

working class during the interwar period, basically because it was the only completely
labor oriented party, its traditional dogmatic Kautskyite style Marxism seemed to be an
alien, foreign import to the sizable number of industrial workers who were transplants
from the rural areas. And it was this "traditionalist" former communist element that
triumphed over the Western welfare state orientation of the younger members as the
elections approached.
The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party broke up on October 7, 1989. The hard liners,
most of them elderly, kept the old name and since that time has been a rather
insignificant, often comical grouping on the political scene. The reform wing formed the
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), a Western style pragmatic socialist party. Through
Imre Pozsgay, as we have seen, the party's populist element had strong connections to the
populist writers in the MDF. Another of its populist leaders, Mátyas Szürös, who as
President of the Parliament read the proclamation of the Republic of Hungary on October
23, 1989, and who served as interim President from that time until the newly elected
Parliament selected a President on May 3, 1990, held a televised press briefing during
Barbara Bush's visit to a refugee camp for ethnic Hungarians who had fled from
Transylvania. Szürös emphasized that he had raised at some length the issue of the rights
of ethnic Hungarians in the neighboring nations, a traditional concern of populists in all
parties, in the course of official discussions with President Bush. There were widespread
but unsubstantiated rumors of the Hungarian army being on maneuvers on the Romanian
border even as the American President was visiting Hungary.
What were the attitudes of these political parties to issues pertaining to religion and
nationalism? With the exception of what was left of the MSZMP, which as already
mentioned was inconsequential, all of the major parties thought that the treatment of the
churches and synagogues, their leadership and membership, during the communist period
had been a travesty. While none of them favored a return to the semi-feudal system of
land ownership that existed until 1945 and under which the Roman Catholic and
Reformed Churches owned nearly one-third of the arable land in Hungary, all of them, to
varying degrees, favored the return of confiscated lands and properties, to the degree that
they could be returned. The only differences, which some Hungarians thought were
significant, concerned how much to return or, more accurately, how much was realistic to
return. The liberals of the SZDSZ and FIDESZ, as well as the Socialists, thought that
confiscated church properties serving a useful social function, i.e. schools, universities,
and hospitals, should not be returned. The populist parties, especially their Christiannationalist factions, favored the return (at least in their rhetoric) of some of these
properties as well. All of the parties were united in their concern that, given the country's
growing economic difficulties, land was indispensable for the support and increasing
need for the self-sufficiency of local churches. They were, given the traditional
inseparability of Hungarian culture and religion, also united in seeing the nurture of
Hungary's religious institutions as absolutely crucial to the task of socio-politicoeconomic-cultural transformation that was at hand.
There were (and are) significant differences between the parties as well. The liberals in
SZDSZ and FIDESZ and the Socialists advocated (and advocate) the separation of church

and state. Some of the Socialists, former reform Communists, were concerned that
religious instruction would be mandated in public schools and that their right to be
atheists would not be tolerated. Most of the liberals, mostly secular intellectuals, many of
them former Marxists, certainly familiar with the more unsavory aspects of Hungarian
religious history, show a very subtle, nuanced appreciation of not only the connection
between religion and culture in Hungarian life and history but the complexities of
theological formulations as well (to the point that I often wish my secularist colleagues in
the USA would show such sophistication). The populists, the Christian-nationalists
especially, it goes without saying, favored a much more explicitly "Christian course":
nurturing the national heritage traditionally linked to being "a Christian nation" through
the provision of religious instruction in public schools. Needless to say, this is a very
controversial issue. To people from the United States, government financed and
supported religious instruction in the public schools will sound strange, smacking of the
"establishment" of religion, which may perhaps seem undemocratic. However, we need
to remember that most of Europe, including Western Europe, has a long history of
established state churches.
In the context of Hungarian politics, the Christian nationalists did want the establishment
of religion, but given the pluralism of religious traditions, they did not advocate the
official state establishment of any particular branch of Christianity. Although they
favored religious instruction in public schools, they envisioned strictly voluntary
attendance, with religious instruction provided by leaders of the various religious
traditions, including Judaism and Islam, for their own members as well as interested nonmembers. In other words, the religious instruction provided in public schools was not
meant to be used as a means of proselytizing. It remained questionable whether the
expectation of such neutrality was realistic and whether the rights of non-believers and
religious minorities could be respected and protected under such a system.
As far as nationalism is concerned, the major parties had no substantial disagreements on
matters of foreign policy. In 1989-1990, with Soviet troops still stationed of Hungarian
soil (the final withdrawal would be completed on June 30, 1991, a date whose
anniversary is a national holiday), all of them agreed that Hungary needed to regain its
full national sovereignty and in that regard promised to negotiate the full withdrawal of
Soviet troops; that Hungary needed closer ties to the West economically and politically
although given the country's geographical location and the complexities of the
geopolitical situation, most political figures at that time maintained that the most realistic
foreign policy orientation was neutrality. As the elections approached and its various
stages unfolded, most political figures, with the exception of the more extreme, more
isolationist nationalist populists of various parties, became increasingly open and vocal
about Hungary's need to join the European Economic Community. Some, mostly in the
MDF, even advocated that the country join NATO--once Soviet troops had been
withdrawn.
Although all of the political parties expressed concern about the plight of ethnic
Hungarians in the neighboring states, they were significantly different in what they
emphasized and the rhetoric they employed. The liberals, with FIDESZ, as usual,

showing greater sensitivity toward the particularities of Hungarian ethnicity, used the
language of universal rights, which had been so effective during the Communist period,
and advocated sensitivity toward the ethnic and national sensibilities of the neighboring
states. The populists, on the other hand, stressed that it was the rights of ethnic
Hungarians that was at stake, the right to preserve the particularities of an ethnic identity,
language, culture, and history.
II.
Now to return to the story of the unfolding events surrounding the referendum on the
presidency and the elections themselves. During the negotiations, the Roundtable
Opposition had agreed that while its members were free to carry on discussions with the
ruling party, the only way they could be successful was by presenting a united front.
Consequently, they agreed that all of the Roundtable's members would have to consent to
a negotiated agreement.
Political life became increasingly complicated as a result of the Roundtable Opposition's
own success. Its members had been united in rejecting the political legitimacy of the rule
of the Communist power; their own political legitimacy seemed to be compromised now
as negotiations had been conducted in secret; yet another "solution" imposed "from
above" appeared on the horizon. Due to public pressure and a desire for legitimacy, a
traditional concern of Hungarian politics, the climactic moments of the final rounds of
negotiations and the previously mentioned agreement took place under the glare of
television cameras.
It was at this point that the previous unity of the Roundtable Opposition broke up and a
pivotal turn in Hungarian political life occurred. The Social Democrats signed the
agreement but rejected the part pertinent to the election of the President. The Alliance of
Free Democrats and the Alliance of Young Democrats refused to sign the agreement
altogether on account of their rejection, voiced during the negotiations, of the provisions
dealing with early elections to the presidency.
Before proceeding with the details of the rest of the narrative, I need to mention that an
important aspect of the strategy of MSZMP and later the Hungarian Socialist Party was
the tremendous popularity of Imre Pozsgay; if early Presidential elections were held, with
other potential candidates virtually unknown, a landslide victory for Pozsgay could be
assured and thus some hold on power also guaranteed. With the exception of the Social
Democrats, SZDSZ, FIDESZ, the other political parties, the MDF in particular, agreed.
There were other considerations that entered their calculations: with the imminent
transition to postcommunism, given the likelihood of massive dislocation resulting from
economic shock treatment, the desirability of foreign investments, it was important both
in terms of domestic politics as well as foreign policy to have a popular, well known
quantity as President.

SZDSZ and FIDESZ, however, wanted to have a public referendum on the presidency. In
order to do so, they needed to collect 100,000 signatures on a petition calling for the
referendum. They had no trouble in doing so.
Hungarian law provides that at least 50% of eligible voters participate in a referendum for
it to be considered valid. Optimistically thinking that since its voters would stay away the
turnout of voters would not approach the necessary 50%, resulting in the nullification of
the referendum, MDF and MSZP advocated a boycott of the vote on the presidency. The
strategy proved to be a big mistake.
Accusing the MDF of collusion with the former communists and increasing the intensity
of their anti-communistic rhetoric, SZDSZ and FIDESZ wound up the big winners of the
referendum; around 60% of eligible voters turned out and approved the referendum by a
very narrow margin.
As the elections approached, the MDF was in disarray following the referendum. Jozsef
Antall became the new leader of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and quickly sought to
distance himself from the populist writers and Pozsgay. Since the anti-communist
rhetoric of SZDSZ and FIDESZ was a winner politically, he and others in the new
leadership of the MDF also escalated the heat and intensity of the anti-communism
rhetoric. He reminded voters of the fact that many in the SZDSZ came from old party
cadre families and of the Marxist and radical past of the leadership of the SZDSZ; János
Kis had been a student and disciple of Görgy Lukács in the early seventies, Miklós
Haraszti had been a Maoist, and the most consistent liberal in the party, Gáspár Miklós
Tamás, had been an anarcho-syndicalist at one time.
The anti-communism of MDF, with its new leadership, had an authentic ring. Antall and
others in his circle came from aristocratic backgrounds; his father had served in the
cabinet of Admiral Horthy, the regent of Hungary from 1920 to 1944; they all claimed to
have suffered during the communist period on account of their background, with Antall
having been arrested but not sentenced in the aftermath of the uprising of 1956. Antall's
political orientation was that of a Western style center-right Christian Democrat whose
political role model was Konrad Adenauer.
It was the liberals of SZDSZ who were now thrown off stride. Hardly in a position to turn
either to the right or the left, the Free Democrats were in search of a constituency. They
sounded increasingly abstract in their political rhetoric and came across as the urbanist
Budapest intellectuals that they are. It also appeared increasingly unlikely that voters
would entrust the government at such a critical time to the leaders of FIDESZ whose
"elder statespersons", Viktor Orban and Gábor Fodor, were at the time 27 and 26 years
old respectively.
The elections were held in two rounds, in March and in April. According to the election
law, only those parties that received at least 4% of the vote in the first round were eligible
to move on to the second. After more than four decades of one party rule, 58 parties
participated (wherever two Hungarians gather together...). The result of the second round

of the voting were as follows: on the center-right, 42.7% for the Hungarian Democratic
Forum, 11.4% for the Independent Smallholders' Party, and 5.4% for the Christian
Democratic People's Party; on the liberal side, The Alliance of Free Democrats was the
recipient of 23.6% of the vote while the Alliance of Young Democrats received 8% of the
vote; and finally, 8.5% voted for the Socialists. With nearly 60% of the vote and seats in
Parliament, MDF formed a center-right coalition with the Independent Smallholders' and
Christian Democratic People's Party.
Although Antall and his circle were essentially middle class intellectuals with a Western
Christian Democratic orientation, it was the populism of the center right parties that had
carried the day. As Misha Glenny has written, "... the slumbering bear of Hungarian
populism awoke from its hibernation ..."
III.
In this section, I shall examine political developments since 1990, focusing on the drift to
the right and the stopping of that drift, especially in relation to issues pertaining to
religion, nationalism, and populism, and the subsequent drift to the left culminating in the
election of the Socialists in 1994. Before doing so, however, I need to turn briefly to the
"populist-urbanist" rift alluded to earlier. Although this rift has Hungarian characterized
Hungarian politics since the 1840s, it has been particularly acute since the beginning
stages of the transition to postcommunism. It is virtually impossible to understand
contemporary Hungarian politics (to the degree it can be understood!) without some
grasp of this fundamental difference in orientation.
Put briefly, the populists are nationalists with a rural orientation who want to preserve the
distinctiveness of Hungarian culture and identity while the urbanists are Western oriented
liberal intellectuals. As Misha Glenny has written:
"... in Hungary there are two distinct and apparently irreconcilable traditions, the populist
and the urbanist. Both claim to work towards the same end but by very different means.
Described crudely, the populists believe that in order to survive Hungarian culture must
remain pure, while the urbanists consider it essential to integrate Hungarian culture with
European patterns. An important sociological difference is the large number of
intellectuals and Jews who are involved with the urbanists. As a result Hungarian
populism has often, but not always, been infected by anti-intellectualism and antiSemitism".
As a consequence of the threat from the right and the apparent dominance of the populist
nationalists, Hungarian liberals and Western observers became concerned about the
country's potential plunge into the "politics of backwardness". There are, however, as we
shall see later, major political figures who do combine elements of the populist and the
urbanist traditions, a synthesis far more typical of the major historical figures of the
populist movement.

Now to return once again to our narrative, the newly formed coalition government and its
parliamentary majority quickly reached an agreement with the opposition , mostly
SZDSZ and FIDESZ, on parliamentary procedures. On May 3, 1990, one day after the
new Parliament convened, its members elected Árpád Göncz, a writer who had been
imprisoned for six years in the aftermath of the uprising of 1956 and a member of
SZDSZ, President of the Republic as part of a deal whereby the opposition supported an
amendment to the constitution limiting the number of issues requiring the approval of a
two-thirds majority in parliament, thus avoiding legislative "gridlock". Göncz has proven
to be the most important stabilizing force on the Hungarian political scene, and the
country's most popular politician; although by the fall of 1993, his approval rating had
slipped to 72%.
Almost from the time it took office, MDF and its coalition partners began a persistently
precipitous decline in popularity. In the municipal elections of October, 1990, SZDSZ
and FIDESZ split the vote, gaining an absolute majority in most municipalities. More
importantly, when the government, without consulting Parliament, the trade unions, or
the Chamber of Commerce, announced that gasoline prices would be doubled the next
day, the cabdrivers of Budapest staged a strike and blockade that brought the entire city
to a halt. All intersections throughout the country were blocked, paralyzing transportation
for two days. The government backed down and a negotiated settlement reached;
gasoline prices were liberalized and the tax on a gallon of gasoline was set a fixed
amount. Public opinion surveys indicated that 60% of the population supported the
cabdrivers unconditionally, with another 25% of expressing sympathy.
Since the cabdrivers strike and blockade, the ruling coalition has been keenly aware and
concerned with its own legitimacy, often questioned by the opposition. As we have seen,
the nagging issue of legitimacy was the fundamental issue behind the referendum on the
presidency, its roots traceable to the secretive nature of the Round Table negotiations.
Hungary's rightward drift and the Antall government's protracted passivity toward it can
be understood in terms of its quest for legitimacy, an attempt to distance from the
communist past.
The rightward drift I have been talking about will be more intelligible through a
chronology of political events pertinent to this paper. In 1991, following televised
debates, Parliament voted to return church properties confiscated during the communist
period. In spite of the rhetorical heat, the real issues being how much could be
realistically returned, especially considering that some of these properties had been
turned into schools, universities, and hospitals, there was little of substance that divided
the ruling coalition and the opposition on this issue. What was of significance was that
previously confiscated schools, predominantly Roman Catholic, Reformed, and Lutheran
were returned. Perhaps of greater significance was Parliament's vote in the same year to
reintroduce religious instruction in the public schools. We have already seen in a previous
section the position of the various parties on this issue, MDF and its coalition partners
backing the measure, seeing it, ideally, not as a means of proselytizing but as a way of
inculcating traditional values, in continuity with historic traditions, the liberals of SZDSZ

and FIDESZ opposing it on civil libertarian grounds and espousal of the separation of
church and state.
I have to mention that the state financed and sponsored textbooks dealing with religion,
written largely by intellectuals with liberal sensitivities, are scrupulous in their
scholarship, eminently fair, impartial, nuanced, and subtle in pointing out the insoluble
link, with all its ambiguities, between religion and culture in Hungary's national heritage.
There have been several other issues that pertain, directly and indirectly, to religion and
religious life. One of these was the issue of calling into account those who were
responsible for the suppression of and the reprisals following the uprising of 1956.
Parliament did pass legislation enabling such legal action to be taken, suspending the
expiration of the statute of limitations. However, President Arpád Göncz, referred the
legislation to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court declared the law
unconstitutional on the grounds that no one could be tried for what was legal under a
previous regime.
The decision of the Constitutional Court raises a number of complex philosophical and
religious issues as well as political and pragmatic considerations. If perpetrators of
atrocities could not be tried because their alleged crimes had legal sanction at the time
they were committed, does this not manifest a relativism, if not nihilism, that sees legality
completely in terms of what particular governments determine to be legal at a particular
time in history? Moreover, how could authentic national reconciliation take place if the
perpetrators of terror were not brought to justice, if there were no historic justice? Was
this the victory of the collective amnesia encouraged until the last year and a half of
communist rule?
A powerful answer on one side was provided by no less a figure than Elie Wiesel during
a visit to the country of his birth. Consistent with his views on the Holocaust and its
perpetrators, he maintained that human rights are universal, that atrocities are atrocities
regardless of their legality at the time of their commission, that "crimes against
humanity" are "crimes against humanity" regardless of their legality or government
sanction during the period of the time they took place.
Part of the consideration of Arpád Göncz and László Solyom, President of the
Constitutional Court and a member of MDF, on the other side of the issue, were
pragmatic. They were acutely aware of how changes in regimes during Hungary's
twentieth century history were accompanied by vengeance and reprisal; if Hungary was
going to enter the 21st century as an authentic democracy, if it was going to rebuild its
society, it needed to let go of this seemingly endless pattern of recrimination. As early as
March 15, 1989, the traditional Hungarian national holiday (which was allowed to be
celebrated legally once again beginning in 1988), when there was an increasing public
outcry in some quarters to "hang all the communists!" Göncz and Solyom encouraged the
spirit of reconciliation and national reconstruction with the slogan "Lift your brains, not
your fists!" I also hasten to add that Solyom's logic was also very strongly influenced by
the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948, which states

that "no one shall be held guilty of any penal offense on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a penal offense, under national or international law, at the time
when it was committed".
Another burning issue was abortion. The historical and socio-politico-cultural context for
the abortion debate is entirely different from that of the United States. In contrast to the
Stalinist laws of the 50's which banned abortion and imposed tax penalties on childless
couples as well as single people, under the Kádár government, in spite of some legal
nuances, abortion was available on demand. With a lack of birth control information,
abortion became the chief method of birth control. The combined effect of a decline in
life expectancy, particularly for middle age males, whose rate of death has been rapidly
increasing, the highest rate of suicide in the world, and one of the world's highest rates of
abortions has led to a decline in population form 10.7 to 10.3 million during the 1980s.
This fueled an old concern of the populist nationalists (dating back to the '30s when
Slovak and Rumanian population growth was more than double that of Hungarian
nationals in their homeland) about the survival of "Magyarság"--a term that can mean
"Hungarian people" as well as "Hungarianess" or "Hungarianhood", a term with no less
mystical connotations than "Ruski narod" for Russians.
Thus, the focus of the abortion debate revolved partly around the opposition by religious
groups, as might be expected, but much more vociferously around the issue of the
survival of " Magyarság." It is important to point out that few of the anti-abortion
advocates wanted a total ban. In fact, there were MDF affiliated Roman Catholic
attorneys of Christian democratic, Christian nationalist persuasion who saw Roe v. Wade
as the best model for Hungarian "pro-life" legislation!
The Constitutional Court decreed that Parliament would have to pass abortion legislation
by January 1, 1992. The compromise that emerged will seem strange to Americans.
Although there is a twenty-four hour waiting period during which women contemplating
abortion have to stay at a house where they will receive "counseling," it is illegal for
"counselors" to influence or manipulate women's decisions in any way (let alone show
pictures of aborted fetuses!) Although the dust seems to have settled, it remains to be
seen how long this compromise lasts.
A related issue was the government's campaign "to return women to the home." Instead
of being an echo of the Religious Right in the United States or the reflection of the
triumph of Central and Eastern European traditionalism, the campaign replicated similar
moves that were carried at times of economic hardship during the Kádár regime. The
rationale was that by reducing the size of the work force with the return of women to the
home, the level of unemployment would also be reduced.
To be sure, there were very strong elements of traditionalism, patriarchy, and anticommunism (seeing the emancipation of women as part of communist ideology) in the
government's campaign, which was strongly opposed by the liberals. The support of
some women for the campaign also reflected their feelings about their experiences under
communism, experiences of the dichotomy between their supposed emancipation and the

reality of oppression. While Hungarian feminists were obviously critical of the ruling
coalition's efforts, they, along with feminists from the other countries of the former
Eastern bloc, never tire of reminding Western feminists of the differences in their
experiences and conditions from those of women in the West, explaining, not justifying,
why many Central and Eastern European women feel the return to the home to be
emancipatory. Although the number of self-consciously and intentionally feminist groups
is small, and in spite of existing inequalities between women and men, in spite of the
anti-feminism and patriarchy of the rhetoric of the government, its efforts were in my
view illusory. Economic conditions in most instances practically necessitate women
working outside the home, while culturally the emancipation of women (i.e. on the
whole, women are better educated than men) has come too far to make retrenchment
possible, let alone desirable.
Another issue that aroused political passions and that is an aspect of the rightward drift
was the so called "media war." As the Hungarian Parliament was about to engage in an
interminable debate about a new "media law" regulating Hungary's state owned TV and
radio (there is one independent TV station that had been in existence even before the
transition, CNN International, HBO, MTV, Eurosport, DUNA TV for ethnic Hungarians
across the borders, BBC, and two German speaking stations, mostly on cable; there are
numerous private radio stations, including an underground gay and lesbian oriented
station in Budapest). Much of the political heat focused on the head of Hungarian TV,
Elemér Hankiss, who had been a dissident and who played an instrumental role in the
historic reappraisal of the uprising of 1956 that led to the ceremonial reburial of Imre
Nagy, a well respected sociologist and frequent visiting professor in the United States
whose Eastern European Alternatives has been one of the most accurate prognostications
of postcommunist developments and has turned into a near classic. To a lesser extent, the
political controversy also focused on the head of the state radio, Csaba Gombár. The
exact nature of the substantive issues involved is difficult to pinpoint. Hankiss did serve
as very convenient and visible target to those who wanted to engage in a "witch hunt" of
former communists and discard former dissidents with communist pasts. Moreover, as a
civil libertarian liberal he eventually wanted to free the Hungarian electronic media
entirely from state control and set it on a path that would follow Western models. For
this, he was accused of "cosmopolitanism" and neglecting the Hungarian national
heritage. The liberals defended him and advocated no state control or jurisdiction over
any of the media. As for Antall himself, he exhibited unusually thin skin when criticized
in the media, much more so than the last communist government. Hankiss and Gombár
were finally suspended (President Göncz refused to abide by Parliament's wishes to fire
them) and arrested on unspecified non-criminal charges of misconduct; their interrogation
was rude and nasty. If we are tempted to say with Yogi Berra that we have already seen
this deja vu, it may be important to keep in mind that Hankiss does not attribute the
slightest bit of malice or undemocratic, authoritarian, dictatorial inclinations to Antall; he
attributes the actions taken against him completely to Prime Minister's hypersensitivity to
criticism.
In talking of Hungary's rightward drift and the stopping of it, I have in mind (as does the
Western press) the issues that have been the center of political debate in postcommunist

Hungary; the rise of anti-Semitism and nationalism. Much of the debate centered and still
surrounds the figure of István Csurka, a writer and playwright, who was one of the
founders of the MDF. From the very beginning, his political rhetoric was full of
passionate anti-Semitism. Indeed, before he turned to politics, he was notorious for
increasingly vociferous anti-Semitic outbursts the more he imbibed, then knocking on the
doors of women he wanted to seduce, loudly calling them "Jewish whores" for not
wanting him. In the 1990 election campaign, the SZDSZ, many of the members and
leadership of which, including János Kis and the author, former President of PEN,
György Konrad, are of Jewish origin, bore the brunt of Csurka's anti-Semitism. Although
Göncz and the leadership of the other parties did condemn anti-Semitism, neither Antall
nor the other leaders of MDF criticized Csurka directly nor did the Prime Minister
distance himself from the populist writer.
Csurka's anti-Semitic rhetoric became increasingly vitriolic. He also attacked Antall
politically and personally, at times on the floor of Parliament in the presence of the Prime
Minister. As vice-president of MDF, the populist writer was assured of high visibility, an
instant forum as well as aura of credibility, not diminished by the Prime Minister's
silence.
As economic conditions declined, unemployment reaching over 600,000 and the inflation
rate at 38% by mid-1992, Hungary started to witness the growing phenomenon of
skinheads, beatings of gypsies, the muggings and beatings of foreign tourists. Police
reaction was inadequate, and there was one reported incident of the police beating several
ethnic Chinese while they were in custody. To have someone of Csurka's stature express
jingoistic, anti-foreign, anti-Semitic sentiment and to have the leadership of his party and
the government tolerate it lent an aura of legitimacy to the seemingly increasing
rightward drift.
It was certainly not the case that Antall and his immediate circle in the leadership shared
Csurka's views. However, it was quite telling that as a political realist the leader of the
MDF and the head of the government seemed too weak in his own party to disavow
Csurka; he seemed unsure about the number of "secret Csurkists" in his own
parliamentary majority who possibly might threaten the survival of the governing
coalition if cut adrift.
There were less kind assessments as well. Philosopher Gáspár Miklós Tamás, one of the
leaders of SZDSZ, observed "Antall is personally not anti-Semite, but he's cynical
enough to tolerate it if he thinks it is useful."
In contrast, President Árpád Göncz became the honorary president of the Martin Luther
King, Jr. Society, formed in response to twenty two beatings of dark skinned students and
gypsies recorded by the Budapest police during the first six months of 1992. The
President also apologized to the students "in the name of the Hungarian people." SZDSZ,
FIDESZ, and the Socialists were unrelenting in pointing to Csurka's resurrection of a
dark side of Hungarian history and Antall's seemingly Machiavellian or patient tolerance
of it.

Things started to come to a head after Csurka published a manifesto on August 20, 1992
in the Hungarian Democratic Forum weekly blaming "the New York-Budapest-Tel Aviv
axis", an international conspiracy among bankers, communists, and the parliamentary
opposition--i.e. Jews--for Hungary's ills. He also made thinly veiled intimations about the
racial inferiority of the gypsies. The choice of August 20 as the date of publication for the
manifesto was not coincidental: it is one of Hungary's greatest national holidays, the day
of St. István (St. Stephen), who Christianized the Magyars, unified the people,
established the Hungarian state, and its historic borders; in 1992, August 20 was the final
day of the meeting of the World Federation of Hungarians, the largest of its kind since
before World War II. The meeting was also attended, as observers, by academics of
Hungarian origin from various disciplines (historians, scientists, philosophers) whose
conferences had been held just prior to the meeting of the World Federation, deliberately
timed to entice them to spend extra time (and money) in their country of origin.
This time, Antall did seek to distance himself, the MDF, and the government from his
nemesis. However, he did not confront Csurka directly, and tepidly maintained that each
family (like the MDF) had its rebellious adolescent who actually did some good by
shaking things up.
The extreme right seemed encouraged, if not legitimized. In early September, about
10,000 of them demonstrated in Budapest. As a response, 100,000 people participated in
a demonstration, co-sponsored by virtually every conceivable political party and
association, for "a democracy without fear."
The anniversary of the Revolution of 1956, October 23, now a national holiday, saw the
occurrence of a very ugly incident. As President Arpád Göncz was about to address the
large crowd gathered in Kossuth Square in front of the Parliament, he was prevented
from doing so by loud whistles and hisses. Among those leading the jeers aimed at
Hungary's most popular politician were neo-Nazi skinheads, who, it has been alleged by
observers, were aided by plain clothed border guards brought to the demonstration by the
Interior Ministry in army trucks. Because of the bright lights illuminating the square, it is
impossible to see any shiny heads on the video of the incident. However, persistent, loud
chants of "Long Live Antall!" are very distinct. The broadcaster for the state owned TV
station mentioned this fact, described it as contrary to the solemnity of the occasion and
the ideals of the Revolution. Needless to say, this fueled the media controversy raging at
the time, with demonstrators gathering quickly at the TV station. Uncharacteristically,
Göncz did not attend the festivities at the Opera House at which Antall was speaking the
night of October 23.
There was growing concern on the part of the liberals as well as the Western media about
Hungary's rightward drift. The concern grew in December, 1992 and January, 1993 as
Csurka made an aborted grab for power in the MDF. Antall had the MDF abolish the
position of party vice-president and had it replaced by a committee of twenty members.
Five of those twenty seats were given to the offended Csurkists, leading to concern that
even if he was defeated for the leadership post, Csurka's power was actually growing in
the MDF; in retrospect, it looked like a move designed to pacify the Csurkists.

However, although some of the liberals and some in the Western media felt Antall
yielded to pressure, especially to threatened as well as actual withdrawal of Western
investment, the IMF's refusal to renegotiate Hungary's debt supposedly because of its
budget deficit, he may very well have been biding his time until he felt strong enough to
move against the populist writer. In late spring, 1993, Csurka and some of his followers
were expelled form the MDF. As a sop to the conservatives, the MDF also expelled two
of the leading members of its liberal wing, including Jozsef Debreczeni, who had
compared the anti-democratic, anti-communist, and anti-Semitic elements of Csurka's
piece of August 20, 1992, to Nazi ideology. Parliament also passed legislation
criminalizing the public display of the swastika and the hammer and sickle. To civil
libertarians in Hungary as well as the West, such restrictions may seem to compromise
the kind of freedom of expression that is a prerequisite for democratic development. An
old question was raised: when you start restricting freedom of expression where do you
stop? What is there to guarantee that such restrictions will stop? In the context of the
history of Hungary over the last fifty years, the restriction of the use of symbols that
arouse violent passions inimical to the stability of a democratic government, it seemed a
relatively small price to pay for a less volatile atmosphere in which democratic
institutions and sensibilities could be nurtured.
As for the ongoing soap opera that constitutes the political career of István Csurka,
shortly after his expulsion from the MDF, the Socialist daily Népszabadság, the most
Western style, informative, and objective among Hungary's postcommunist newspapers,
gleefully disclosed that Csurka had worked as an informer for the III/III, the successor to
the notorious AVO, the state security police. The populist writer did not only not deny
the accusation, his response was flip, bordering on the contemptuous. As mentioned
before, the Socialists did not attempt to disguise their glee, an attitude the liberals found
ironic. The liberals, on the other hand, took a Havel like approach; they maintained that
everyone was guilty of complicity in the maintenance of the communist system and
focused their criticism not on Csurka's past or his person but the dark, potentially
ominous forces he came to represent.
The populist writer's followers, sizable in the populous Hungarian emigre community
throughout the world, felt betrayed. Inside and outside Hungary, Csurka seemed
discredited. Nevertheless, he was undeterred, founding his own political party, Magyar
Igazság ("Hungarian Truth or Justice"; Igazság can mean both truth and justice) és élet
(life). He also started his own foundation and newspaper, Magyar Ut (The Hungarian
Way)--the name of a famous populist journal of the '40s.
The spectre of anti-Semitism had once again raised its ugly head. Hungary does have a
long history of anti-Semitism, with deep roots in Christian anti-Judaism, culminating in
the liquidation of 90% of the Jewish population of Hungary during the Holocaust. To be
sure, the mass deportation of Jews did not begin until the German occupation in March,
1944. Unfortunately, much of the gendarmerie, other governmental authorities, and some
segments of the population, particularly in the rural areas, participated enthusiastically in
the deportations. The Jewish Hungarians who were saved were, for the most part, either
inhabitants of Budapest or refugees who had managed to escape to the city. The reign of

terror perpetrated by the fascist Iron Cross saw an almost desperate attempt to eliminate
what was left of the Jewish population until nearly the last possible moment before the
final victory of the Red Army.
This all too brief and inadequate allusion to the long and ambiguous history of antiSemitism in Hungary hardly begins to do justice to a topic of enormous complexity and
consequence. Suffice to say three things of significance. First, as with most countries in
the former Soviet bloc, the Holocaust had not been dealt with adequately. Second, antiSemitic populist nationalists, who, like their predecessors, see Jews as "alien" and
"foreign", therefore undesirable and a threat to Magyarság, conveniently forget that some
of the greatest heroes of Hungarian history saw the country's Jewish population as fully
Magyar, their contributions to Magyarság of immeasurable value: during the Revolution
1848-1849, Sándor Petöfi, Hungary's national poet, and Louis Kossuth, the regent at the
time, fought for the emancipation of the Jews, a measure enacted by the Diet in 1849.
Ferenc Deák, a "Haza Bölcse" ("the country's or homeland's wise one") insisted on
emancipation being a part of the compromise of 1867 that created the Austro-Hungarian
empire. Anti-semitic populist nationalists also conveniently forget that Jewish
Hungarians have participated in the country's struggles for independence, whether in
1848 or 1956, in disproportionate numbers. They were also the victims of the ensuing
reprisals in disproportionate numbers. The amnesia of today's nationalist populists also
includes an the aversion to anti-Semitism on the part of some of the very people in the
populist movement of 1930s and 1940s to whom they trace their direct ancestry
(although, admittedly, some were anti-Semites; most of them, as a result of the
persecution of Jews during World War II, abandoned all anti-Semitic references).
It is painful to read people like János Kis and István Eörsi, a liberal writer who had been
imprisoned for three years in the aftermath of 1956, assert that they would not remember
that they were Jews if the anti-Semites had not reminded them. Miklós Haraszti, one of
the leaders of SZDSZ and the last person tried in Hungary for political crimes, recalls
that, never having been told of his Jewish origins by his parents, he found out about them
from the anti-Semitic remarks of his classmates in public school. There are few countries
in the world the Jewish populations of which are as assimilated as Hungary's, a country
and a heritage they genuinely love in spite of the fact that it has not always appreciated or
wanted them.
It is significant that, with all the controversy surrounding the resurgence of antiSemitism, a poll has shown that 75% of the population believe Jews to be part of the
Magyar nation, comparing favorably with the region's other countries where notions
about Jews being a tribe alien to the national majority are widespread. Another poll
showed that only twelve percent of Hungarians had unfavorable opinions about Jews,
indicating a lower-rate of popular anti-Semitism than in most other countries even though
Hungary has twice as many Jews as the other five countries of the former Soviet bloc
combined. The results of studies of a similar study in Poland, to use one example,
indicated that, although there are only approximately 5,000 Jews in the country, fully one
third of respondents thought its Jewish populations had "too much power", with 47%
expressing the sentiment that Jews should not have the right to be elected to parliament.

Negative attitudes towards Jews stood at 34% in Poland, 20% in the former
Czechoslovakia, and 14% in France. In the United States, similar studies showed that in
the 1960's about one-third of the population held negative stereotypes of Jews with
another third showing mild evidences of anti-Semitism. When the study was repeated in
1981, results showed a significant decrease in anti-Semitic stereotyping, with the
percentage of those thinking that Jews have "irritating faults" dropping 40% to 19%, the
proportion responding affirmatively to the notion that Jews are "stick together too much"
declining from 52% to 40%, and the segment of those believing that Jews indulge in
"shady business practices" falling from 42% to 23%.
In any event, instead of helping politically, there has been a backlash against the
resurgence of anti-Semitism: certainly compounded by continuing economic hardship,
the approval rating for the MDF led coalition government dropped to 15% by mid-1992,
below 10% by the summer of 1993 (what they would not give for Bill Clinton's "low"
approval ratings!)
I shall turn at this point to a discussion of the issue of the resurgence of nationalism.
The controversy began on June 2, 1990, when Jozsef Antall, recently having taken the
office of Prime Minister, declared that in addition to being the Prime Minister of ten
million Hungarians living in Hungary, in a legal sense, he considered himself the Prime
Minister of all fifteen million ethnic Hungarians living all over the world in a spiritual
sense. While explicitly rejecting the use of violence to redraw borders, alluding to
Hungary's being a signatory to the Helsinki accords, Antall did say that "historically," he
felt compelled to condemn the Treaty of Trianon. When the Prime Minister's statement
raised considerable controversy, he reiterated his conviction that the Hungarian
government had "a moral and spiritual duty to be responsible for every member of the
fifteen million member Hungarian community."
The condition and rights of ethnic Magyars, particularly in Transylvania, Slovakia,
Vojvodina, and the Carpatho-Ukraine has been a concern for many Hungarians since the
Treaty of Trianon (1920), which ceded to neighboring states two thirds of Hungary's
territories inhabited by one-third of its ethnic Magyars, some of its richest resources, and
most "sacred" historical places. The Treaty of Trianon provides the historical context for
twentieth century Hungarian nationalism. During interwar period, ethnic Hungarians
were often denied the right to their ethnic integrity, especially in Transylvania. In no
small measure, this was a reaction against the Hungarian government's policy of enforced
"Magyarization" in the late nineteenth, early twentieth centuries. Hungary's neighbors
have sensitive memories of the interwar period's Horthy regime's unequivocally
irredentist policies and eventual alliance with the Axis Powers in order to regain lost
territories where the majority of the population was made up of ethnic Hungarians.
The immediate aftermath of World War II saw the expulsion of ethnic minorities in a
number of countries in the former Eastern bloc; Hungary expelled many "svabs"
(Germans) and Slovaks; Czechoslovakia expelled ethnic Germans and Hungarians.
Although under communist rule, the lid was supposedly kept on nationalism and ethnic

conflict, communist governments suppressed national minorities and ethnic groups, used
nationalist rhetoric, and pursued nationalist policies.
The most immediate historical context that aroused the concern about ethnic Magyars
was Nicolae Ceausescu's policy of "systematization" or modernization of the countryside,
which threatened the very existence of historic villages in Transylvania. Although in
actual fact only Romanian villages were destroyed, the steady stream of ethnic Hungarian
refugees across the borders into Hungary in the late 1980s led to the accusation that
Ceausescu's policies were a form of cultural genocide. As early as June, 1988, between
thirty and fifty thousand people participated in demonstrations against the village
reconstruction plan; the largest demonstration in Hungary since 1956.
The pivotal role of László Tökés, an ethnic Hungarian, now a Bishop of the Reformed
Church, and honorary chair of the Hungarian Democratic Union, the largest opposition
party in Romania, in the events that served as a catalyst for the Revolution of 1989 are
well known. Incidents of ethnic violence occurred in the spring of 1990; ethnic tensions
have continued, with Tökés holding an eleven day a hunger strike in September.

